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Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, section 14 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HAROLD BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case NO.920086-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(d) ("appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a circuit court.") 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should this court abandon the pretext search doctrine? 
2. Was the trial court clearly erroneous in finding that 
Officer Wasden was justified in stopping defendant Beckstead even 
though there was no traffic violation which would warrant the 
stop, and that the officer had only a "..."hunch, *I suspected 
that he may have been drinking based on the driving pattern I had 
seen.7?" 
6 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference 
and are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 
State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258, and n.5 (Utah 1987). 
Questions of law are to be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp.f 700 P.2d 1068, 1070, (Utah 
1985) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are at issue in this 
case: 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thin to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or thing to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Beckstead was charged with one count of driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44 (Supp. 1990). 
On the 10th day of July, 1991, counsel for Mr. Beckstead 
filed a Motion and Memorandum to Dismiss on the Grounds of 
Pretext Stop performed by Officer Wasden of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department on the 17th day of March, 1991. A copy of the 
motion to dismiss is contained in Appendix 1 to this brief. A 
copy of the Relevant portions of the transcript (hereinafter 
referred to as T.) is contained in Appendix 2. 
At the Jury Trial, held on the 12th day of August, 1991, 
counsel for the defense cross-examined Officer Wasden concerning 
the stop of Mr. Beckstead. (T. 1-16) 
The City made a motion to declare a mistrial following the 
testimony which was granted by Judge Jones on the 12th day of 
August, 1991. The matter was then reset for Jury Trial on the 
6th day of September, 1991 and the jury was excused. 
Defense counsel filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on 
the 5th day of September, 1991, based on Judge Jones7 order 
denying Defendant's Motion to dismiss on the Grounds of Pretext 
Stop. 
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Defense counsel submitted a Motion to Stay Proceedings in 
the Trial Court Pending Ruling in the Utah Court of Appeals on 
Defendant and Appellant's Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order which was granted by the trial court on the 
5th day of September, 1991. 
Counsel requested Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
from the trial court on the 4th day of September, 1991, yet none 
was received by defense counsel. 
The Court of Appeals denied Defendant's Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal on the 18th day of November, 1991. The 
matter was then reset for jury trial on the 20th day of December, 
1991 at which time the Defendant entered a plea of Nolo 
Contendere conditional upon Defendant appealing the trial court's 
denial of the Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Pretext Stop. 
Defendant then filed the present appeal on the 11th day of 
February, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Wasden was the only witness testifying at the Jury 
Trial regarding the pretext stop motion. During cross-
examination by Defense Counsel, Officer Wasden stated, when asked 
if Mr. Beckstead had violated any traffic laws, "No, sir." (T. 
10). He also agreed that Mr. Beckstead "didn't do any kind of 
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traffic violation that would warrant pulling him over?" "No, 
sir." (T. 11). 
Officer Wasden also testified that Mr. Beckstead7s alleged 
weaving did not endanger any other vehicle as the lane he was 
driving in was very wide. (T. 12). However, he still proceeded 
to stop Mr. Beckstead based solely on his suspicion that Mr. 
Beckstead had been drinking. (T. 13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court should not abandon the pretext search 
doctrine discussed in State v Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). This court should reverse the trial court/s finding that 
Officer Wasden did not act pretextually in stopping Mr. 
Beckstead. The trial court's ruling that Officer Wasden's stop 
of Mr. Beckstead was not pretextual was due to the court's 
feeling that probable cause existed for the stop based solely on 
Mr. Beckstead's driving pattern. 
The trial court's findings are clearly erroneous in finding 
that Officer Wasden was justified in stopping Mr. Beckstead due 
to Officer Wasden's testimony that there was no traffic violation 
which would warrant pulling Mr. Beckstead over. 
In the event that this Court requires additional findings of 
fact, it should direct the trial court to find (1) whether 
Officer Wasden's "hunch" that Mr. Beckstead was driving under the 
10 
influence was justification for the stop and (2) whether a 
reasonable hypothetical officer would have stopped Mr. Beckstead. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue before this Court has been hotly debated in this 
and other jurisdictions. However, well established precedent 
regarding the illegality of pretext stops provides that this 
Court should find that based on the facts of the case the stop of 
Mr. Beckstead was Pretextual. This Court stated in State v. 
Lopezf 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1992), that, 
"The question of whether a warrantless police traffic 
stop violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution is particularly fact sensitive and, thus, we 
review the underlying facts of this case in detail. State 
v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App. 1989); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App. 1988); rev'd on other 
grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)." 
As in Lopez. the facts of this case are the most important 
factor in determining this issue. In Beckstead, as in Lopez, 
Officer Wasden was the only witness called during the dismissal 
hearing, and the facts are therefore largely based upon his 
testimony. 
L DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OP THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE 
The pretext doctrine has been defined by many courts in 
search and seizure cases. As this Court stated in Lopez
 P 
In recent years, this court has joined other courts in 
construing the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
by adopting what we now commonly refer to as the "pretext 
doctrine." See, e.g.r Grovier, 808 F.2d at 135-37; State v. 
11 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80; see also United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986); sources 
cited in footnote eight. In Utah, the pretext doctrine 
applies in cases where an officer claims to have stopped a 
vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court 
determines the stop was not made because of the traffic 
violation but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation 
and, therefore, the has deviated from the normal course of 
action expected of a reasonable officer. Sierra. 754 P.2d 
at 978. We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether 
a "reasonable . . . officer, in view of the totality of the 
circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped" 
the vehicle for the traffic violation absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. Id. 
This Court's opinion that the pretext doctrine applies 
in cases where there is a minor traffic violation is vitally 
important to the instant case. In the instant case there was 
absolutely no traffic violation which wold have given Officer 
Wasden probable cause to stop Mr. Beckstead. The Court goes 
further to state that, 
"This court has utilized the "pretext" doctrine in two 
distinct situations. First, we have applied it where the 
facts demonstrated the driver did not commit a traffic 
violation.1 Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 
979." 
Id. at 6. 
1
 There is little question that under these circumstances 
a traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge Russon's dissenting 
opinion would recognize such stops as unconstitutional. 
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Additionally, 
"There is little question that under these 
circumstances a traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge 
Russon's dissenting opinion would recognize such stops as 
unconstitutional." Id. 
In Lopez the Court has found that this variation of the pretext 
doctrine; i.e., where a traffic violation has not occurred is 
unconstitutional, and as such, should find that the stop in the 
instant case unconstitutional as well. 
The Court has approved the pretext doctrine's validity 
numerous times in other cases. (See State v. Lovegrenf 798 P.2d 
767, 770 n.10 (Utah App. 1990) (Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, J.J.); 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1990) (Billings, 
Davidson, and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 
(Utah App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990) (Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot. 792 
P. 2d 489, 491-92 (Utah App. 1990) (Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, 
J.J.); Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, 
J.J.)). Additionally, there have been several federal circuit 
courts which have approved the pretext doctrine. See Guzman, 864 
F.2d at 1515; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 710-11.2 
2
 But see United States v. Trigg. 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th 
Cir.) (rejecting pretext doctrine), cert, denied sub nom.. 
Cummins v. United States, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); 
United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990) 
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In Lopez
 f the Court indicated that, 
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, 
ratified our application of the pretext doctrine in State v. 
Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). There, the Utah 
Supreme Court reached the issue of whether a voluntary 
consent which occurred after a pretextual traffic stop was 
sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal pretext stop 
to allow the consent to validate the warrantless search. If 
the Arroyo court disapproved of the pretext doctrine, logic 
suggests the court would have rejected the doctrine and 
reversed this court without ever reaching the attenuation-
consent issue. In fact, the Arroyo court referred to our 
pretext holding with approval: 
[t]he court of appeals agreed [with the lower 
court's pretext finding], stating that under the 
totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable 
officer would not have stopped Arroyo and cited 
him for %following too closely' except for some 
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity." The trial court and the court of 
appeals were clearly correct on [the pretext] 
issue—Trooper Manqelson's stop was an 
unconstitutional pretext. 
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). Additionally, the 
majority of other states which have considered the issue 
have adopted the pretext doctrine. 
These cases fully support the validity and approval of the 
pretext doctrine by numerous courts throughout the land as well 
as this Court. As a result, this Court, based on the 
circumstances in the instant case, has a duty to uphold the 
pretext doctrine and reverse the trial court's erroneous ruling. 
(same), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991). 
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
secures the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend IV. 
The issues presented now on appeal pertain specifically to 
the Fourth Amendment and the pretext doctrine. The trial court 
contends Officer Wasner was justified in stopping Mr. Beckstead 
even though no traffic violation had occurred which would justify 
the officer's stop of Mr. Beckstead. The Court has joined other 
courts in construing the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment by adopting what we now commonly refer to as the 
"pretext doctrine." Seer e.g.. Grovier, 808 F.2d at 135-37; State 
v. Marshallr 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; Sierra, 754 
P.2d at 977-80; see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 
1518-19 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 
708 (11th Cir. 1986); 
The Court also stated that, 
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We are persuaded the pretext doctrine is necessary to 
prevent the abuse of various exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment7s warrant requirement. See United States v. 
Triggf 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the 
doctrine protects citizens from arbitrary activity by police 
officers and supports the Fourth Amendment's requirement of 
objective reasonableness to support any invasion by law 
enforcement. See Maryland v. Maconf 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 
105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978). Finally, the 
pretext doctrine requires courts to focus on the realities 
of police practices—not pretenses—thus protecting the 
integrity of the courts. See United States v. Keller, 499 
F. Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. 111. 1980); Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 689. 
The Court goes further, stating, 
"Allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any 
minor violation when the officer in fact is pursuing a hunch 
would allow officers to seize almost any individual on the 
basis of otherwise unconstitutional objectives. Such 
unfettered discretion offends the Fourth Amendment. See 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); 
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 711." 
Additionally, 
"Accordingly, we reaffirm our adoption of the pretext 
doctrine. It protects the privacy of all individuals by 
requiring that police be consistent in their enforcement of 
traffic regulations and prevents police from conducting 
warrantless searches and seizures based on an otherwise 
insufficient hunch of more serious criminal activity." 
III. THE REASONABLE OFFICER STANDARD 
In Lopez, the Court ruled that, 
"...the issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext 
stop cannot turn on the issue of an officer's subjective 
intent, but rather, must turn on the objective question of 
whether a reasonable officer would have made the stop under 
the same circumstances absent the illegal motivation. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 
at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097. 
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"[A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the 
officer secretly hope[s] to find evidence of 
a greater offense, but because it [i]s clear 
that an officer would have been uninterested 
in pursuing the lessor offense absent that 
hope." In other words, "the proper basis of 
concern is not with why the officer deviated 
from the usual practice in this case but 
simply that he did deviate." 
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (quoting United States v. 
Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 and 1 W. Lafave, Searches and 
Seizures § 1.4(e) at 94). 
In a pretext stop setting, such as we have in the instant 
case the Court held that, 
"...the State first has the burden to show the 
warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus, the State must 
establish that a traffic violation occurred in the officer's 
presence or that the officer had probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had 
occurred. Cf. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709 
("weaving" not a violation of Florida Law). Once the State 
makes this showing, the defendant must put forth some 
evidence to support the defendant's claim that the stop was 
a pretext stop. Cf. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 886 (party with 
burden of pleading affirmative defense has burden of going 
forward with evidence sufficient to raise issue). 
If the defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue, 
the burden of proof is then ultimately upon the State to 
show that a reasonable officer would have made the stop 
absent the alleged illegal motivation.3 Seer e.a>, Mann, 
3
 The ultimate burden of proof is properly on the State for 
several reasons. First, because the seizure was conducted 
without a warrant, the State should bear the burden of showing 
the stop was not an intrusion on the defendant's reasonable 
expectation of privacy, including a showing of what a reasonable 
officer would do under the same circumstances. See Arroyo. 796 
P.2d at 695. Additionally, because the State has the primary 
access to most of the relevant evidence, including the officer's 
past stop practices and the practices of other officers, we 
believe the burden of proof is properly placed on the State. 
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712 P.2d at 10 (State must show valid legal basis for stop 
and within exception to warrant rule); see also Arroyor 796 
P.2d at 687-88 (in consent setting, State has burden of 
showing consent was voluntary). 
In the instant case, Officer Wasden based his stop on nothing 
more than a hunch that the defendant was driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Therefore, if the reasonable officer 
standard is applied, it becomes apparent that without further 
evidence, the stop was pretextual. The Court ruled for the 
Defendants in a similar case stating that, 
"Officer Rawlinson's decision to search Defendants' vehicle 
was based on nothing more than a "hunch" that the search 
would yield drugs. 
In short, Officer Rawlinson was unable to articulate 
sufficient facts that would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that Defendants were under the influence of drugs 
of alcohol, much less that they had committed or were about 
to commit a crime, such as drug trafficking. Although 
Officer Rawlinson's "hunch" ultimately proved to be correct, 
a "hunch," without more, is not sufficient to raise a 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 (citing Terry. 392 U.S. at 27, 88 
S.Ct. at 1883); accord Godina-Luna. 179 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
23. Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Rawlinson's 
detention of Defendant exceed the scope of the traffic stop, 
was not justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, and was therefore illegal." 
State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) at 6. 
Seer e.q.r Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 
1982) (burden of proof lies with party most likely to have access 
to evidence). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court's past experience with the issue of pretext stop 
and its prior rulings on such matters are clearly outlined above. 
Based upon those prior rulings and the facts in the instant case, 
this Court should uphold the pretext doctrine in the instant 
case, reverse the trial court7s findings, and remand the case 
back to the trial court. / 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / A~dav of April, 1992. 
L. J&m-
Lawyer for Mr. Bfeckstead 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Larry Long, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
forgoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and that 
four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the Salt Lake 
City, Prosecutor's office at 451 south 200 East in Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 17th day of April, 1992. 
f/ty 
L. L^ng— 
Mu I/LM< DELIVERED by '" f. lwri- "-(/ -^^^^ i ^ this 17th day of 
April, 1992. 
^ <£ ^J/I^ 
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L. Long #1989 
Lawyer for Defendant 
39 Exchange Place #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 583-9207 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case no. 912010903 
HAROLD BECKSTEAD, Hon. Maurice D. Jones 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, 
L. Long, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to dismiss this 
matter on the grounds that the arresting officer did not have 
probable cause to stop the vehicle and therefore the stop was a 
pretext for further inquiry. 
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. 
, - Thomas Jefferson 
DATED this
 #/^faf April, 1991. 
CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t ha t on the J j j T d a y of AjP&M~- , 1991, I 
personal ly delivered/jaGrijfcfed the preceding Motion to Dismiss t o 
the following: 
Clerk of the Court 
Third Circuit Court 
451 South 200 E^st 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 E^st 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Hon. Maurice D. Jones 
451 South 200 E^st 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Harold Becksteacj 
3065 Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
fP(a4.i /LMl4>h 
L. Long, #1989 
Lawyer for Defendant 
39 Exchange Place, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 583-9207 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAROLD BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 912010903 
Hon. Maurice D. Jones 
COMES NOW, the defendant, HAROLD BECKSTEAD, by and through 
his counsel of record, L. LONG, and respectfully enters the 
following Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
The Stop of Defendant's Vehicle Was Not Based on 
a Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity 
And Was Therefore a Pretext Stop 
Defendant contends that Officer Wasden's stop of his 
vehicle was not based on a reasonable suspicion, but instead was 
a pretext, not unlike that in the cases of State v. Arroyo
 P 770 
P. 2d 153 (Utah 1989), and State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah 
1988). In Sierra, Judge Billings, expounded on the issues of 
violation of an individual's rights under the United States 
Constitution and its Utah Constitution counterparts- Judge 
Billings stated: 
In establishing the constitutional standard to stop a 
particular automobile, the United States Supreme Court 
has clearly denied an officer the right to randomly 
stop cars on public roads. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
662; State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662, 99 S.Ct. at 1400). 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court has stated: 
Were the individual subject to unfettered 
governmental intrusion every time he entered 
an automobile, the security guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment would be seriously 
circumscribed. As Terry y, Ohio, [392 U.S. 1 
(1968)], recognized, people are not shorn of 
all Fourth Amendment protection when they 
step from their homes onto the public 
sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those 
interests when they step from those sidewalks 
into their automobiles. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663-65, 99 S.Ct. at 1401-02. 
[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement officers to 
use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for 
evidence of a more serious crime. See United States v. 
Millio, 588 F. Supp. 45, 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). Accord 
United States vs. Lef kowitz
 f 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 
S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. §77 (1932); Taolavore v. 
United States, 291 F.2d 262, 565 (9th Cir. 1961). 
The violation of a constitutional right by a 
subterfuge cannot be justified. . . . Were 
the use of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a 
pretext for searching people suspected of 
felonies to be permitted, a mockery could be 
made of the Fourth Amendment and its 
guarantees. The courts must be vigilant to 
detect and prevent sucfy a misuse of legal 
processes. 
Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 266. 
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In determining whether a stop for a traffic 
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext, the 
totality of the circumstances governs. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. at 885 n.10, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 n.10. In making 
this determination the subjective intent of the officer 
is irrelevant. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation 
has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on 
the officer's actual state of mind at the time the 
challenged action was taken." Mary1and v. Macon, 472 
U.S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) 
(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 
(1978)). Accord Morane v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 
S.Ct. 1135, 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); United States 
v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Morane v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 
1135, 1142, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). The Supreme Court, 
almost without exception, has emphasized objectivity 
in evaluating purported fourth amendment violations. 
[T]he Court has first undertaken an objective 
assessment of an officer's actions in light 
of the facts and circumstances then known to 
him. The language of the Amendment itself 
proscribes "unreasonable" searches and 
seizures. In Terry, the Court emphasized the 
objective aspect of the term reasonable. 
. . . And in making that assessment it is 
imperative that the facts be judged against 
an objective standard; would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of 
the seizure or the search "warrant [an 
officer] of reasonable caution in the 
belief" that the action taken was 
appropriate? 
Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 
1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (citations omitted). 
State v. Sierra, 724 P.2d at 977-78. The circumstances 
surrounding the stop in the instant action are not circumstances 
under which a citizen would be stopped by a traffic officer on 
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routine patrol, unless that officer were looking for drunk 
drivers. 
An individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures is protected and guaranteed both by the Fourth 
Amendment and by the provisions of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the person or things to be seized. 
The following analysis, quoted at length, was presented by 
The Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Judge of the Utah Fourth Circuit: 
Court, in an article printed in the October, 1989 American Bar 
Journal, vol 2, no. 8. 
Government uhas a legitimate interest in crime 
prevention and detection." State v. Trulillo, 739 
P. 2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). But personal 
privacy rights are paramount, and intrusion must be 
scrutinized under the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment. The balance between public 
interest and an individual's constitutionally 
guaranteed right to personal security and privacy 
tilts in favor of freedom from police 
interference. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
These interests often compete; public interest 
in crime prevention may conflict with an 
individual's right to be free from arbitrary 
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interference from law officers.1 The state also 
has a strong interest in safeguarding citizens' 
rights of privacy, liberty and ^  autonomy against 
unsanctioned or unfettered intrusions. 
The United States Supreme Court first 
explicitly permitted a seizure upon suspicion short 
of probable cause in the landmark case of Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, a veteran 
police officer observed two men whom he believed 
were casing a store for a robbery. An on-the-
street confrontation resulted in a pat-down search 
of the suspect and the discovery of a weapon. The 
court found the government's interest in crime 
prevention and detection outweighed the suspect's 
right of privacy and recognized the search as an 
exception to the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Terry teaches that a police officer may not 
act on a hunch, mere speculation or 
unparticularized suspicion, but only on specific 
reasonable inferences based on facts, in light of 
the officer's experience, Tel. at 27. While not 
capable of precise definition, "reasonable 
suspicion" has been characterized as a combination 
of specific and articulable facts together with 
reasonable inferences from those facts, which, in 
light of the officer's experience, reasonably 
justify a belief that the person to be stopped had 
committed, was committing or was about to commit a 
crime. Id. 
The Court reaffirmed the reasonable suspicion 
test in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 <1983), 
where it stated that "the predicate permitting 
seizures upon suspicion short of probable cause in 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court recognized this 
conflict in State v. Lopez, 552 P. 2d 120 (1976); 
State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (1977); 'State 
v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980); and State v. 
Porsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). The Utah Court 
of Appeals recognized these competing interests in 
its first reasonable suspicion case, State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah &pp. 1987). 
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that law enforcement interest warrant a limited 
intrusion on the personal security of the suspect." 
The standard articulated in Terry and also in Brown 
v. Texas has come to be known as the "reasonable 
suspicion11 test. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422~U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975). 
What is the proper scope of the reasonable 
suspicion test? In a long line of cases, the Court 
has significantly expanded the application of the 
test.2 Terry involved a violent crime in which 
there was a legitimate fear of immediate physical 
danger to the officer. However, it is clear that 
the reasonable suspicion test applies to factual 
setting beyond the enforcement need as presented in 
Terry. There is also no doubt that it applies to 
vehicle stops as well as on-the-street detentions. 
Most recently it has been applied to the growing 
number of drug courier profile cases.3 Terry 
insists that the conduct of officers enforcing the 
law be subjected to the more "detached, neutral 
scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure." 
392 U. S. at 21-22. However, the court in Terry 
failed to explain what quantum of suspicion is 
necessary to justify an investigatory stop or 
search. In addition, Terry and its progeny have 
failed to announce a definitive standard 
enunciating at what point of an investigatory stop 
Fourth Amendment protections are implicated. These 
issues continue to plague appellate and trial 
courts. 
THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD APPLIED IN UTAH 
2
 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); 
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
(1975); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 
(1978); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United 
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
3
 United States v. Medenhall, 446 U.S. 544 
(1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438. (1980); 
Florida v. Roverf 460 U.S. 491 (1983);Florida v. 
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); United States v. 
Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989) 
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Ucah courts have long recognized the 
"reasonable suspicion" standard and have applied it 
in a growing number of investigative stop cases.4 
This standard is codified in Utah Code Ann. Sect. 
77-7-15(1982): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address, and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have been particularly active in 
deciding investigatory stop cases in the last 
several years.5 It is significant "Co note that 
4
 From March 1985 through August 15, 1989, the 
Utah Supreme Court decided seven investigative stop 
cases. From June 1987 through June 1989, the Utah 
Court of Appeals decided nine such cases. Several 
cases involve overlapping issues. 
5
 Here is a chronological review of the Utah 
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals cases 
discussing "reasonable suspicion" standards in 
conjunction with an investigative stop or search: 
State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d. 1302 (Utah 1983). 
Police stopped defendant based upon the belief that 
his driver's license had been revoked. The officer 
had previously arrested defendant for DUI and knew 
his license status. the Court held that officer 
had reasonable suspicion that the license was still 
revoked, conviction affirmed. 
State v. Swaniaan, 699 P.2d. 718 (Utah 1985). 
Description of two men seen in area by another 
officer two hours previously was insufficient to 
give officer reasonable suspicion to stop two men 
walking at 1:40 a.m. three blocks from the 
burglary. The investigatory stop was improper and 
the evidence seized was not admissible to burglary 
trial. Conviction reversed. 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d-f. 675 (Utah 1986). 
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The facts are complex and reader is referred to 
text. The majority held that there was probable 
cause for officer's stop and search of the 
vehicle. Drug charge affirmed. 
Dorsey is included herein because Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion challenges the 
applicability of the probable cause standard, 
substituting an investigative stop standard in its 
place. Justice Zimmerman concluded that the search 
was lawful as incident to a Terry stop, and the 
reasoning is important to any practitioner 
attempting to understand the application of an 
investigative Terry stop standard in Utah. 
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d. 125 (Utah 
1979). Officer had reasonable suspicion to stop 
automobile because officer knew of revoked license 
and outstanding arrest warrant. Conviction 
affirmed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d. 616 (Utah 1987). 
Police responded to burglar alarm at video shop. 
Upon arriving, officers observed a vehicle leaving 
the area. One followed the vehicle to a residence 
and waited for occupants to exit it. He called to 
them and asked if he could speak to them. Then 
crossed the street and presented identification 
upon request. Neither defendant was arrested. The 
officer returned to the shop, determined that a VCR 
was missing and returned to the residence. 
Defendants agreed to talk to him and allowed him to 
look in the vehicle. Officer observed a black 
rectangular object and arrested defendants. 
An officer may approach citizen at any time 
and ask questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will. In this case, citizens 
willingly talked to officers; therefore trial court 
did no err in refusing to suppress evidence. (The 
court also outlined two other constitutionally 
permissible police encounters: (1) an officer may 
seize a person if he has an articulable suspicion 
that the person has or is about to commit a crime; 
the detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop; (2) an officer may arrest a suspect if he has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been or is 
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being committed.) The Utah Supreme Court relied on 
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d. 223 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d. 85 (Utah App. 
1987). Officer detained trio of pedestrians who 
admittedly had not violated any traffic ordinances 
or engaged in any criminal behavior. Officer 
based his initial detention upon four factors: (1) 
it was a high-crime area; (2) lateness of the hour; 
(3) apparent nervous conduct of trio; and (4) 
"suspicious" nylon knapsack Trujillo carried. 
Officer testified that his search of Trujillo, on 
whom a knife was discovered (forming the basis of 
the felony charge), was based upon "intuition." 
Officer's seizure and subsequent search of 
Trujillo violated Fourth Amendment. Knife should 
have been suppressed. No reasonable suspicion 
found; conviction reversed. 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d. 181 (Utah 1987). 
Police stopped car on 1-15 south of St. George, 
Utah, based on: (1) apparent Latin descent of 
occupants; (2) route of travel; (3) time of day 
(4:50 a . m . ) ; (4) time of year (March); 
(5) California license plates; (6) erratic driving 
pattern with police car tailing two to six feet 
behind; (7) nervous behavior of occupants. 
Court held that officers did not have 
reasonable suspicion that defendants were engaged 
in illegal activity. Therefore, trial court's 
finding that the stop violated defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights was not clearly erroneous. 
Suppression of evidence affirmed. 
Court further held the Utah Fourth Amendment 
Act, which purported to create a "good faith" 
exception to such searches, unconstitutional. A 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can 
never apply to an investigatory stop and search in 
that, if no reasonable suspicion exists to justify 
the investigatory stop, the officer's conduct was 
not reasonable within the meaning of the exception, 
and, in any event, the exception cannot operate 
where there is no outside authority on which the 
officer reasonably relied. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2dA 972 (Utah 1988). 
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Sierra, driving northbound on 1-15 in vehicle with 
New York plates, was stopped for minor traffic 
violation because of his "suspicious nature" and 
his failure to make eye contact with officer. A 
search of auto revealed drugs. Court found officer 
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Sierra. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Court announced a "hypothetical reasonable 
officer" standard; if a hypothetical reasonable 
officer would not have stopped the driver for the 
cited traffic offense and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, the 
stop is unconstitutional. 
State v. Aquilar, 758 P. 2d. 457 (Utah App. 
1988). Aquilar involved an investigatory stop on 
1-15 where written consent to search van was 
obtained. A search revealed 383 pounds of 
marijuana. In light of Sierra, the initial stop 
was suspect but Court declined to address whether 
the stop was a violation of Aquilar's Fourth 
Amendment rights, finding that voluntary consent 
to search purges the taint of any illegality. 
Conviction affirmed. 
State v. Seryf 758 P.2d. 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
Sery arrived at the Salt Lake International Airport 
carrying a blue suitcase with brown trim, there was 
nothing unusual about his appearance or attire. 
After what appears to be normal activity in an 
airport, he was detained by three officers, 
questioned and released. He was later detained 
again outside the terminal, taken back inside, and, 
based upon a canine drug sniff of his luggage was 
arrested. 
Seven facts were enumerated by respondent in 
support of the reasonableness of officer's 
suspicion. Sery (1) arrived from Florida; 
(2) waited a few minutes at the gate and looked 
nervously in direction of officers; (3) went to 
telephone booth and twice stood up and looked in 
direction of officers, (4) took strange route from 
phone booth area back to concourse; (5) possessed 
plane ticket on which he claimed his name had been 
inaccurately recorded; <6) told officer he had no 
identification on him; and (7)^ left a telephone 
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number with airline reservationist that had been 
changed to an unpublished number. 
Court found that the facts relied upon by 
officer did not support a reasonable suspicion that 
Sery was engaged in criminal activity. Because the 
seizure of Sery and his bag for the canine drug 
sniff violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the 
evidence found in the search of his bag should have 
been suppressed. Conviction reversed and case 
remanded. 
State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P. 2d 2 (Utah App. 
1988). Deputy based his decision to follow 
defendant's pickup truck upon his observation that 
he had seen this particular truck when he had 
inspected Ernie's Automotive parking lot just 15 
minutes earlier, and that there was no legitimate 
reason for truck to be there, since Ernie's had 
been closed for over eight hours. This 
observation elevated the deputy's decision to 
follow the truck from a mere hunch to a fact 
sufficient for deputy to conclude that occupants 
may have been engaged in criminal activity. 
Conviction affirmed. 
State v. Baird, 763 P. 2d. 1214 {Utah App. 
1988). Defendant's conviction for possession of 
165 pounds of marijuana found in trunk of car he 
was driving reversed because officer stopped car 
on a hunch; "something just struck [him] funny" 
about the license plate sticker. State attempted 
to justify the stop by evidence discovered 
afterward, including a twisted-off gas cap, 
defendant's confusion about the ownership of the 
car and the smell of marijuana. While this may 
have justified a further inquiry of the driver 
after a valid stop, more articulated suspicion must 
be present at the time of the stop and must be the 
reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable 
or articulable suspicion existed to justify the 
stop. The evidence used to convict defendant was 
derived by exploitation of the impermissible stop, 
and it should have been suppressed. Conviction 
reversed. 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P. 2d 153 (Utah App. 
1989). Judgment for defendant based on ruling 
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that officer's stop was a pretext was reversed 
because a search conducted pursuant to voluntary 
consent purges the taint from the prior illegality. 
State bears burden of proving that consent was 
voluntarily given. Defendant freely admitted that 
his consent to search was voluntary before the 
trial judge, but denied it on appeal. However, 
defendant's consent had been established and purged 
the taint of the illegal stop, thereby making 
admissible the kilogram of cocaine found inside the 
passenger door panel. Conviction affirmed. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d 326 (Utah App. 
1989). Officer stopped vehicle for faulty brake 
light. Defendant was passenger. Driver had ID but 
no registration, and ID did not match the name of 
registered owner obtained through dispatch. 
Officer requested identification from passenger, 
reasoning that vehicle may be stolen. Officer ran 
a license check on driver and passenger and 
determined driver was driving on suspension and 
passenger had several warrants. Incident to the 
arrest, a backpack belonging to defendant was 
searched and was found to contain amphetamines, 
drug paraphernalia and defendant's Utah 
identification. Court held that nominal allusions 
to the Utah Constitution at trial were insufficient 
to preserve issue on appeal. Court further held 
that there was reasonable suspicion to support the 
seizure in that the car could have been stolen and 
defendant was not detained for an unreasonable 
period of time. Conviction affirmed. 
State v. Holmes, 774 P. 2d. 506 (Utah App. 
1989). Defendant was passenger in vehicle which 
was stopped by two plainclothes officers. 
Defendant was observed standing on a sidewalk 
talking with other male drivers and got into a 
vehicle after conversing briefly with driver. 
Officers suspected a "prostitution deal" and 
followed the vehicle. After observing a "somewhat 
evasive" driving pattern, officer stopped the 
vehicle. One officer approached driver, and other 
officer watched passenger. Officer testified as to 
"furtive gestures" of defendant, observed her take 
something from her purse and stu£f it down between 
12 
in the majority of those decisions, the courts have 
not found the requisite reasonable bnd articulable 
suspicion necessary to sustain an investigatory 
stop, search or seizure. Those decisions have 
largely resulted in acquittals or in suppression of 
the evidence.6 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO 
INVESTIGATORY STOPS HAVE RELIED UPON TRADITIONAL 
the car seat and console. Officer demanded the 
material and finally reached in and obtained it. 
Inside he discovered syringes containing cocaine. 
Court found reasonable and articulate suspicion to 
support: the stopping of the vehicle, but found the 
search illegal. Defendant's conviction for 
attempted possession of a controlled substance 
reversed and case remanded. 
State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 
(1989). Defendant was passenger in vehicle 
stopped for speeding. Officer witnessed passenger 
bending forward in vehicle, acting fidgety, turning 
to left and right, and turning back to look at 
officer. Upon stopping vehicle, driver exited with 
valid driver's license and valid registration. 
Defendant's behavior led officer to conclude that 
he was trying to hide something. Officer asked 
Schlosser for identification as a pretense for 
trying to determine what he may have been hiding. 
Officer opened truck door, scanning interior for 
contraband, and saw a bag of marijuana. He also 
smelled marijuana smoke. Court found no reasonable 
articulable suspicion to support the search. Court 
also found that the opening of the door by officer 
exceeded the legitimate objectives of the traffic 
stop.. The "furtive movements" of passenger did 
not give rise to an articulable suspicion 
suggesting criminal activity. Court affirmed trial 
court's suppression of the evidence, finding 
neither reasonable suspicion for probable cause to 
support the search. 
6
 It is the observation of this authoir, though 
not yet empirically supported, that the acquittal 
rate in investigatory cases is significantly higher 
than in other appellate criminal -flecision areas. 
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FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS, NOT 
UPON INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS 
The language of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution is virtually identical with that 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. That may be one reason why the Utah 
Supreme Court "has never drawn distinctions 
between the protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provision. Rather, the [c]ourt has 
always considered the protections afforded to be 
one and the same." State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 
1221 (Utah 1988). Yet in the same opinion, the 
Court announced its interest in the applicability 
of an Article I, Section 14 argument by stating, 
"Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitution a 
somewhat different construction may prove to be an 
appropriate method for translating the state's 
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given the Fourth Amendment by the 
federal courts. Id. at 1221 n.8. Thus is appears 
that the Court has not foreclosed the possibility 
of distinguishing the protections afforded by the 
respective constitutional provisions in a future 
case. At the very least, there are mixed signals 
from the Courts. 
While Utah has developed no separate body of 
state constitutional search and seizure law, both 
Justices Durham and Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme 
Court have expressed a willingness to seriously 
consider an analytical approach praised on Article 
I, Section 14 arguments.' Justice Zimmerman has 
1
 See, e.g. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d. 803 
(Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P. 2d. 261 (Utah 
1986) {Durham, J., concurring on Utah Constitution 
Articles I and V grounds); State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d. 181 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); 
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d. 1042 
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting); State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d. 264, 281-73{Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, 
J. , concurring) ; American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 
701 P.2d. 1069 (Utah 1985) (Durham, J., for the 
majority, relies upon the Utah Constitution's self-
incrimination provision, Article I and XII; 
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stated that "[tjhe federal law as it currently 
exists is certainly not the only permissible 
interpretation of the search and seizure 
protections contained in the Utah Constitution."8 
Such an analysis may extend the scope of individual 
protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures beyond that accorded by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Writing for the majority in State v. Earl,9 
Justice Durham noted that neither the state nor the 
defendant had discussed or relied independently on 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution. 
She further noted that despite the Court's 
willingness to independently interpret the Utah 
Constitution in other areas of law, "the analysis 
of state constitutional issues in criminal appeals 
continues to be ignored."10 Justice Durham 
concluded that "[i]t is imperative that Utah 
lawyers brief this Court on relevant state 
constitutional questions."11 Justice Zimmerman was 
equally emphatic in State v. Hygh,12 stating that 
"(sjound argument may be made in favor of positions 
at variance with the current federal law respecting 
both the scope of the individual's right to be free 
from warrantless searches and seizures and the 
remedy for any violation of that right."13 
Even in light of these frequent announcements 
of receptivity, state constitutional arguments have 
rarely been raised in an investigatory stop 
Zimmerman, J., concurring, suggests an Article I, 
Section 14 analysis). 
8
 State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d. 264, 273 {Utah 1985). 
9
 716 P.2d. 803 (Utah 1986) 
1 0
 Id. at 806 
1 1
 Id. 
1 2
 711 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1985) 
1 3
 IcL. at 272. 
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context. When presented, they have been found to 
be inadequately briefed or argued or untimely 
raised. A mere five cases are reported. 
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,187 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court found no reasonable 
suspicion to justify the initial stop of the 
subject vehicle. The Court held that the 
investigatory stop violated defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. State constitutional arguments 
were not raised. But Justice Zimmerman 
independently observed in his concurring opinion 
that "the whole question of protections that are 
afforded by the remedies available under Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah constitution, "[Utah's] own 
search and seizure provision has never been 
carefully considered by this court." Id. at 187. 
Also, in his dissenting opinion in State v. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085, n.l (1986), Justice Zimmerman 
comments on the lack of briefing of the state 
constitutional issues. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed 
Article I, Section 14 arguments in an investigatory 
stop context in State v. Aauillar, 758 P. 2d 457 
(Utah App. 1988), State v. Arroyo, 770 P. 2d 153 
(Utah 1989), and State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 
(Utah App. 1989). 
In Aauilar
 f the Court confined its analysis to 
the protections granted under the United States 
Constitution. It did so because "although Aquilar 
recited the Utah Constitution's Fourth Amendment 
provision in his brief, he did not argue that the 
Utah Constitution yields a different result than 
the United States Constitution." Aauilar, at 4 58, 
n.l. See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) . 
In State v. Arroyo, 770 P. 2d 153, the Court 
also confined its analysis to the protections 
granted under the Fourth Amendment, but for 
different reasons. The Court found that "a three 
line conclusory statement as to the grea:ter scope 
of state constitutional protections [was] an 
insufficient briefing for [the court] too embark on 
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a state constitutional analysis." Arroyo, at 36, 
n. 1. 
The Court, in State V. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 
declined to consider a state constitutional 
argument under a preservationist doctrine. The 
Court found that l![n]ominaliy alluding to such 
different constitutional guarantees without any 
analysis before the trial court does not 
sufficiently raise the issue to permit 
consideration by this court on appeal." Johnson, at 
328. Accord James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah App. 1987). 
We may conclude from this brief analysis: 
1. A nominal invocation of the state 
constitution is insufficient to raise state 
constitutional protections; see also State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). 
2. State constitutional arguments must be 
adequately briefed and argued at every level of the 
case. 
3. Such arguments must set forth the 
reason why the Utah Constitution yields a different 
result than the United States Constitution. 
Lastly, the Utah Supreme Court has cited 
with approval the state constitutional analytical 
guidelines set forth in State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 
221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985).^ 
1 4
 The Court outlined various, non-exclusive, 
analytical approaches including: 1) the use of 
fundamentally historical materials including 
legislative history; 2) the textual approach 
(construction of the language); 3) a sibling-state 
approach — comparing what other states with 
identical or similar constitutional clauses have 
done; 4) the use of economic and sociological 
materials in constitutional litigation. The Court 
offered other guidelines and reference materials 
and the reader is referred to the text. 
For additional information see. Note, The Utah 
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Terry encouraged the judiciary to decide each 
case on its own facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
Utah appellate courts have appropriately recited 
the fact of each case in great detail. A 
determination of the constitutionality of a police 
officer's stop of a person under the Fourth 
Amendment runs upon the facts of each case. State 
v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah App. 1988). 
Prosecutors and defense counsel alike err when 
citing controlling case law without first urging 
the finding of particular facts. Every analytical 
stage of an investigative stop case requires a 
totality of the circumstances consideration in that 
all decisions are highly factual in nature. For 
example, an investigative stop must be limited both 
as to scope and duration "to satisfy the conditions 
of an investigative seizure." State v. Serv, 758 
P.2d 935, 952 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). The length of the 
stop, a critical fact to be determined, may 
transform it from an authorized Terry stop into a 
de facto arrest requiring probable cause, United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
In a suppression hearing, witnesses invariable 
offer conflicting versions of the facts. Deference 
is traditionally afforded the fact finder to 
determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. 
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Holyoak, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (1987); State v. 
Walker, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1987). Appellate 
courts recognize that the trial judge is in a 
preferred position to assess the witnesses' 
credibility in a suppression hearing. See State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972. The trial courts factual 
evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress ought not to be disturbed 
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 
1986, Utah L. Rev. 319 and Davis & Wallentine, A 
Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of 
Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 BYU J. of Pub. 
L. (1989). 
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unless clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d at 183; Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
However, no such deference is afforded the 
trial court in its application of the law to the 
facts. The Utah Court of Appeals recently noted 
that "in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon factual findings, we afford 
it no deference but apply a 'correction of error' 
standard." State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2d at 327, 
citing Gates v. Chavez, 749 P. 2d 658, 659 (Utah 
1988). Appellate courts are charged with rhe duty 
to correct errors in application of the law to the 
facts. Stare v. Swanigan, 699 P. 2d 708, 719 (Utah 
1985); State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87(Utah App. 
1987). 
VEHICLE STOPS ARE "SEIZURES" NECESSITATING 
THE OPERATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
The Utah Court of Appeals is State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988) agreed with the 
U.S. Supreme Court by announcing that "the stopping 
of an automobile and the consequent detention of 
its occupants constitutes a 'seizure' within the 
meaning of rhe Fourth Amendment, despite rhe fact 
that the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention is quite brief." See Delaware 
v. Prousef 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also State 
v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983). 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that 
any time a police officer stops an automobile, the 
stop necessarily involves a seizure requiring 
reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. 
Baird, 763 P. 2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Court in Sierra further pointed out that a 
stop of a vehicle may be constitutionally justified 
on one of two alternative grounds. First, 
"reasonable suspicion" must be based upon specific, 
articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that the defendant 
had committed or was about to commit a crime. 
Sierra, 754 P. 2d at 975; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; 
State v. Christensen, 676 P. 2d 408, 412 (Utah 
1984); Trujillo, 739 P. 2d at 88 .-\ Second, the stop 
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could be incident to a lawful detention for a 
traffic violation. Sierra, Id. 
In the thorny field of investigatory stops, 
it is for the fact finder, based upon the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether the 
police/citizen encounter amounts to a seizure of 
the person, giving rise to Fourth Amendment 
protections and scrutiny, or whether the encounter 
intrudes upon no constitutionally protected 
interests. Utah appellate courts have adopted some 
helpful guidelines in this area. 
In State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), 
the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the standard 
enunciated in United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 
223 (5th Cir. 1984). In Merritt, the Courx: 
delineated three levels of police encounters with 
the public which the Court held to be 
constitutionally permissible. The Court 
established these parameters: 
1. An officer may approach citizen any 
time and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will. 
2. An officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime; 
however, the "detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop." 
3. An officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense 
has been committed or is being committed. Id. at 
230. 
Those constitutionally sanctioned levels of 
police encounter have also been adopted by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in State v. Baird, 763 P. 2d at 
1216, and State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals in State v. 
Trujillo held that "a seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment occurs only when the officer 
by means of physical force or the show of authority 
has in some way restricted tftfe liberty of the 
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person.M See also United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). The Truiillo Court went 
on to say that n(w]hen a reasonable person, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not 
in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's 
investigation, but because he believes he is not 
free to leave a seizure occurs." 739 P. 2d at 87. 
Cf. Florida v. Rover, at 501. 
THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" STANDARD 
"No area of law has more bedeviled the 
judiciary, from the Justices of the Supreme Court 
down to the Magistrate," than the Fourth 
Amendment.15 As one commentator has pointed out 
"[wjhat has bedeviled the justices of the Supreme 
Court is the quantum of evidence that is necessary 
to constitute articulable suspicion. The 
puzzlement has flowed from the highest court in the 
land down to the police officer on the beat."16 
Utah's appellate courts have struggled with the 
application of the reasonable suspicion standard, 
and justices have clashed over critical factors 
which trigger its application as opposed to a 
probable cause standard.17 
Practitioners, judges, and legal scholars 
recognize the difficulty in applying the reasonable 
suspicion standard. The Supreme Court in United 
States v. Cortez. 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), noted 
that "terms like articulable suspicion and founded 
l b
 LaFave, Search and Seizure, The Course of 
True Law has not...Run Smooth, 1966 U. 111. L. F. 
255 (1966) 
1 6
 Note, The Limits of an Investigatory Stop 
on Grounds Less Than Probable Cause of Individuals 
Who Display the Characteristics of a Drug Courier 
Profile, Florida v. Royer, 1984 Howard L. Rev. 345. 
1 7
 Representative cases where Utah's justice 
and judges have been sharply divided include State 
v. Schlosser, at 42; Dorsev, at 1090; Sery, at 950; 
State v. JohnsonP at 329. 
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suspicion are not self-defining; they fall short of 
providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad 
of factual situations that arise.11 Despite this 
reality, Justice Rehnquist announced in the same 
opinion that the concept of reasonable suspicion is 
"one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment.11 Id. 
The announcement of bright line definitions 
and a "litmus-paper test" that many practitioners 
seem to demand from our appellate courts would be 
strikingly foreign to traditional Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The Utah Court of Appeals 
recognized this principle in State v. Serv, 758 
P. 2d at 943 n.3, where it noted that "no litmus-
paper test can determine whether the police 
possessed sufficient facts to justify a person's 
seizure." As Justice Rehnquist recently announced 
in United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 
(1989), "the concept of reasonable suspicion, like 
probable cause, is not 'readily, or even usefully, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
In a recent investigatory stop case, State v. 
Baumaaertel, 762 P. 2d 2 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding 
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop 
the subject vehicle. The Court stated that "when a 
police officer sees or hears conduct which gives 
rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only the 
right, but the duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the law is 
being violated; and if so, to take such measures as 
are necessary in the enforcement of the law." Id. 
at 52 (citations omitted). What conduct gives rise 
to suspicion of a crime? 
What factors are probative or of little 
probative value in determining whether or not an 
officer has reasonable suspicion to stop or to 
search? Conclusions from extant case law are set 
forth below. However, it must be stressed that the 
unique combination of facts in each case must be 
evaluated and no single factor should be declared 
probative or non-probative when separated from its 
unique factual setting. 
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We may conclude from all recent decisions: 
1. Latin descent has only minor probative 
value in determining if a suspect has entered the 
country illegally. Mendoza, at 183; Arroyo, at 
155. 
2. The route of travel and out-of-state 
license plates have little probative value in 
determining if the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle. Carpena, at 675. 
The fact that a traveler in a drug case 
has come from a "major source11 city is of some 
significance, but is not: a weighty facror. Reid v. 
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). See also 3 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, Secc. 9.3(c) (2d ed. 1987). 
An officer's statement that "someching 
just struck me funny about [the out-of-state 
license plate]" was held insufficient to justify 
the stop. State v. Baird, at 1215. 
3. The time of year and the time of day 
of the stop have little relevance. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d at 183; Carpena, at 675; Swaniaan, at 719; 
Truiillor at 86. But the time of day was found 
significant in Stare v. Baumaaertel, at 4, in 
tandem with other factors. 
4. Nervous behavior and failure to make 
eye contact. These are highly ambiguous at best. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 
the failure to make eye contact can have no weight 
in determining if the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 
Mendoza, at 183-84; Sierra, at 976. The Court in 
Sery further noted that "if the officer cannot 
articulate the unusual mannerisms or actions by 
the defendant that led to a conclusion of 
nervousness, it is impossible for any reviewing 
court to determine, after the fact, whether the 
person's apparent nervousness was any different 
from that observed in countless travelers — of if 
the nervousness existed at all." Sery, at 944. 
"The officer's mere conclusions regarding 
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defendant's nervousness, unsupported by relevant 
objective facts, can have no weight in determining 
if he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity." State v. Dorsev, 731 P. 2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986). The Court in Trujillo concluded that 
nervous conduct on the part of the defendant when 
confronted by a law enforcement officer was 
"consistent with innocent as well as criminal 
behavior." Lastly, the Court in Sierra concluded 
that lack of eye contact affords no weight in 
determining if the officer had reasonable suspicion 
to conduct the investigatory stop. Sierra, at 975 
(citations omitted).18 
5. High crime area. Carpena, Swanigan, 
and Trujillo suggest that "traveling in a lawful 
manner at a late hour in a high crime area and 
acting in a nervous manner in the presence of 
police is not sufficient to support a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect is involved in criminal 
conduct." State v. Baumgaertelf at 4. 
" [A]n area's reputation for criminal 
activity should not be imputed to an individual." 
State v. Holmes, at 509. A "high crime area" 
factor is insufficient, alone, to constitute 
reasonable suspicion. Holmes, at 509. 
Nevertheless, it is one factor which can be 
considered by the trier of fact in applying a 
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. For 
example, an officer was justified in asking 
defendants for ID and an explanation of their 
13
 One legal commentator concludes after his 
review of recent drug courier profile cases, 
Mendenhall, Reid and Rover, that "nervousness," as 
a highly particularized yet plain and subjective 
fact, plays an important part in establishing 
reasonable suspicion. He suggests that the "use of 
the profile was upheld in Mendenhall and Rover and 
the only characteristic found in those cases but 
not in Reid was "'nervousness.'" Becton, the Drug 
Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected • Tho Th' 
Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd 
Eve, N.C. L. Rev. 458(1987). 
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presence in an area where police had responded to a 
burglar alarm. State v. Deitman, at 618. 
6. Furtive gestures. In the recent case 
of State v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 42 
n.5, the Court observed that "if furtive gestures 
are coupled with prior reliable information 
indicating possible criminal conduct, further 
investigation may be justified." United States v. 
Paiari, 715 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1983). The Court 
found the "furtive gestures" in Schlosser to be 
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion to 
search. The Court in State v. Holmes, at 511, 
announced that furtive movements or gestures "must 
be shown which, in the totality of the 
circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent 
person to believe that there is evidence of 
criminal activity." It is one factor which can be 
considered in the analysis, but, isolated, cannot 
be given any weight. Furtive gestures were 
recognized in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 
(1984). Furtive gestures by the defendant with 
his knapsack were held insufficient in Truiillo, 
at 86. 
7. Misc . Faulty equipment:, plus 
suspicion of stolen vehicle constituted adequate 
reasonable suspicion in State v. Johnson, supra at 
326. The fact that an officer learned only days 
before that defendant's license had been revoked, 
plus confirmation with dispatch, constituted 
reasonable suspicion to stop. State v 
Constantino, 732 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1987). Where an 
officer had previously arrested defendant for OUI 
and knew his license status, Court held officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop. State v. Gibson, 665 
P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983). 
Utah courts acknowledge that a trained 
law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and 
articulate meaning in given conduct which would be 
wholly innocent to the untrained eye. Truiillo, at 
88; Mendenhall, at 564; State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935, at 941 (Utah 1988). However, the officer 
frequently does not articulate the perceived 
meaning from the subject actions to the trial 
court, resulting in a suppression of the evidence. 
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Lastly, Utah courts have further noted that 
officers are "entitled to assess the facts in 
light of [their] experience."19 In this regard a 
prosecutor errs at a suppression hearing when 
failing to elicit the training, experience, 
background and schooling of the officer. A 
consideration of that collective experience may be 
critical in determining whether the stop was based 
upon a hunch or upon articulable suspicion. 
THE "HYPOTHETICAL REASONABLE OFFICER" STANDARD 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals announced a legal 
framework to protect individuals from pretextual 
misdemeanor traffic arrests. The Court stated that 
"in traffic violation stops, in balancing the 
rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary 
interference by law enforcement officers and the 
government's interest in crime prevention and 
public protection, if a hypothetical reasonable 
officer would not have stopped the driver for the 
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding 
circumstances indicated the stop is a pretext, the 
stop is unconstitutional." Sierra, at 979. 
Earlier in the Sierra opinion, the Court emphasized 
that the proper inquiry is not whether the officer 
could validly have made the stop. Rather, the 
focus is on whether a hypothetical reasonable 
officer, in view of the totality of the 
circumstances, would have stopped the vehicle. Id. 
at 978. 
In announcing the "hypothetical reasonable 
officer" standard, the court relied upon a curious 
collection of state and federal cases: United 
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Diaas v. State. 345 So.2d 815 (Fla. App. 1977); 
State v. Blair, 691 S.W. 2d 259 (Mo. 1985); State 
v. Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. App. 1971); 
i y
 State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d. at 509; see 
also State v. Folkes. 565 P. 2d. 1125, 1127 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977); Brignoni-
Ponce, 442 U.S. at 885; Brown, 443 U.S. at 52 n.2; 
State v. Baumaaertel, 762 P.2d. 2^4 <Utah App. 1988) 
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Urquhart v. State, 261 So.2d 535, 536 (Fla. App. 
1972); 5 LaFave Search and Seizure Sect. 5.2(e) (2d 
ed. 1987). Unfortunately, those courts declined 
the opportunity to defined "hypothetical reasonable 
officer."20 Likewise, no reported Utah decision 
has interpreted "hypothetical reasonable officer." 
The Utah Court of Appeals has most recently 
applied this standard in State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 
15 3, 15 5. The Court was persuaded that a 
"reasonable officer would not have stopped Arroyo 
and cited him for 'following to closely' except for 
some unarticulated suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity." The Court concluded that the 
stop was an unconstitutional pretext to search for 
drugs. 
The announcement of a "hypothetical reasonable 
officer" standard presents a host of questions. 
What constitutes the "hypothetical reasonable 
officer?" Is the standard statewide or regional? 
What factors may be relied upon in this difficult 
line-drawing exercise? What if the arresting 
officer always cites a violator of a particular 
offense, but no one else on the force does? How 
does the imposition of the standard impact 
individual officer's discretion and exercise of 
initiative? Does the defense merely have to assert 
that a hypothetical reasonable officer would not 
have made the stop in order to place its 
constitutionality at issue? Does the plaintiff 
then have the burden to show that a hypothetical 
reasonable officer would have made the stop? What 
kind of evidence can be submitted? Expert 
^
u
 The State cases all rely on State v. 
Holmes, 256 So. 2d. 32, which held that a traffic 
violator is not immune from the seizure of evidence 
of a more serious crime "provided that the gravity 
of the traffic offense is such that any citizen 
would routinely be stopped for it if seen 
committing the offense by a traffic officer on 
routine patrol." Holmes, at 34; Blair;- at 263; 
Urquhart, at 536; Diggs , at 816. At least these 
courts identify the reasonable officer as a 
"traffic officer on routine patr<al." 
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testimony? Utah courts have recognized that 
officers are entitled to asses the facts in light 
of their experience-21 Does that individualized 
deference to the collective experience of the 
officer conflict with the application of the 
hypothetical reasonable officer standard? 
The employment of this standard thus far is 
limited to stops incident to traffic violation. 
Ultimately, this strike standard must be applied by 
the trier of fact without the benefit of 
elucidating criteria. Hopefully, future cases may 
address some of these concerns. 
2 1
 See note 19 
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WHERE NO REASONABLE OR ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
EXISTS TO JUSTIFY THE STOP, AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE 
IS INSUFFICIENT TO CURE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STOP 
ABSENT AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
In State v. Baird, 763, P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 
1988), the Court held that the 165 pounds of 
marijuana should have been suppressed. An officer, 
who was unaware of Arizona's color scheme for 
determining license plate sticker validity, lacked 
reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop 
where the officer later testified that he stopped 
the vehicle because "something just struck me funny 
about" the sticker. Id. 
Lack of reasonable and articulable suspicion 
for the initial stop decided consideration of the 
after-acquired evidence in justifying the stop. 
Baird, at 1215. "The State attempted to justify 
the stop by the after-discovered evidence of new 
tires and shocks, a twisted-off gas cap, the jack 
in the back seat, the defendant's confusion about: 
ownership of the car and the smell of marijuana." 
Id. , at 1217. The Court held chat "while this may 
have justified a further inquiry of the driver 
after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must 
be present at the time of the stop and must be the 
reason for the stop." Id. The Court further 
observed that the "evidence used to convict the 
defendant was derived by exploitation of the 
impermissible stop." Id. 
The Arresting Officer Did Not Have 
Probable Cause to Arrest the Defendant for DUI 
A. The odor of alcohol alone is not 
sufficient to establish probable 
cause for arrest. 
In several recent cases, most notably from the Colorado 
Supreme Court, the courts have focused on the indicia of 
intoxication necessary to constitute probable cause. In People 
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v. Rovbal, 672 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1983), the Colorado court held 
that the odor of alcohol alone is not sufficient to establish 
probable cause for a DUI arrest. In Roybal, the defendant was 
involved in a collision with another vehicle. The police officer 
testified that the defendant had an odor of alcoholic beverage 
about him, but appeared to be coherent, seemed to walk in a 
fairly normal manner, and didn't have any problems talking. 
Based on this set of circumstances, the Colorado Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial court and held that the state had not 
established probable cause for the arrest. The court noted that 
although the officer's testimony and his decision to administer a 
blood test were suggestive of an opinion that the defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol, the only objective fact to which 
the officer testified in support of his conclusion was the odor 
of alcohol. 
If an officer does not have reasonable grounds to believe 
that an individual is under the influence of alcohol then the 
arrest should not be made. Some of the elements which may 
establish intoxication are the smell of alcohol on defendant's 
breath (State v. Bugger, 483 P. 2d 442 (Utah 1971); Layton City v. 
Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Utah 1987)); slurred speech (Noon, 736 
P.2d at 1038); poor balance fId.; Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d 
778, 779-80 (Utah 1986)); drooling (Lopez, 720 P. 2d at 779); and 
various field sobriety tests (Noon, 7<36 P. 2d at 1038; Lopez, 720 
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P.2d at 779-780). In combination these indicators of 
intoxication, while not exclusive, may be enough that a 
"reasonable and prudent person in [the arresting officer's] 
position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." Noon, 736 P.2d at 1037. 
In the instant case, however, as in Roybal, the only 
objective fact that Officer Wasden relied on was an odor of 
alcohol. That alone is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion to justify further custodial interrogation, and 
therefore, there is no probable cause for the arrest. 
B. The field sobriety tests were 
illegally obtained. 
It has been widely held that temporary detention for the 
purpose of investigating alleged traffic violations is not 
synonymous with in-custody interrogation which requires a Miranda 
warning. Salt Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1987); 
State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1987); Salt Lake Citv v. 
earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). However, "An accused must be 
apprised of his Miranda rights if the setting is custodial 
rather than investigatory. In other words, at the point 
environment becomes custodial or accusatory, a police questions 
must be prefaced with a Miranda warning." Garner, 664 P. 2d at 
1170. The Utah Supreme Court has already ruled, by negative 
implication, on the unconstitutionality and impropriety of 
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sobriety tests given under the circumstances of the instant 
action. In Garner the court allowed evidence of a field test 
because there were "no indicia of arrest such as handcuffs, 
locked doors or drawn guns . . . present when officer asked the 
defendant to perform the field sobriety tests." Id. at 1171. 
The court further implies that if a defendant is "forced, coerced 
or intimidated into performing" the sobriety tests, the evidence 
would have been unconstitutionally obtained. Id. at 1172. 
Absent the results of the field sobriety tests the officer 
did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant. There is no 
indication that the field sobriety tests were not satisfactorily 
performed by the defendant and therefore no probable cause 
existed for the arrest. The only evidence obtained by the 
officer which would justify probable cause for DUI arrest are 
not the results of the field sobriety tests, but only that the 
officer detected an odor of alcohol, which by itself is 
insufficient. 
The most recent case which deals with this issue is the 
February 7, 1991 decision from the Utah Supreme Court, State of 
Utah v. Johnson, P.2d (Utah 1991). In Johnson, the 
Utah Supreme Court outlined the three levels of police stops. 
These three levels are as follows: 
1. [A]n officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his 
will. 
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2. an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop"; 
3. an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is 
being committed." Johnson, pg 2 of the slip opinion. 
The Court went further to explain the various elements 
necessary to justify level two and three police stops and 
arrests. The following is a recital of the issues laid out by 
the Utah Supreme Court as held in Johnson regarding stops and 
arrests. 
"'When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, 
he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he 
examines the vehicle registration and the driver's license.' 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P2d. 1132. The length and scope of the 
detention must be '...strictly tied to and justified by' the 
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 19-20 (1968). In addition, as the State 
point out, the fourth amendment allows officers to further detain 
the vehicle and its occupants when the driver fails to produce 
identification or is not the owner. United States v. Harris, 
528 F.2d 1327 13-30 (8th/ circuit 1975) In justifying the 
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion. Terry v. Ohio
 f 392 U.S. at 21. While the lack of a 
registration certificate and the fact that the occupants did not 
own the car raised the possibility that the car might be stolen, 
this information, without more, does not rise to the level of an 
articulable suspicion that he car was stolen. As Judge Orme of 
the Court of Appeals stated in his dissent, the 'facts are just 
as consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver 
borrowed the car from its rightful owner.' State v. Johnson, 771 
P2d at 329." 
The Utah Court of Appeals also recently handed down their 
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opinion regarding investigatory stops. In State v. Steward, 153 
Utah Ado. Rep. 24 (1991), the Court held as follows: 
The fourth amendment provides that 'the right of the people 
to be secure in their person, houses, papers , and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated...' U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
Consistent therewith the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, 
each of which requires a different degree of justification 
to be constitutionally permissible....11 (see above). 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court first articulated the narrow level two exception 
to allow police officers, in certain circumstances, to make 
limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on 
less than probable cause. The stopping of a vehicle and the 
consequent detention of its occupants constitute a level two 
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, even if 
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention 
brief. State v. Sierra 754 P2d. 972 {Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
In the case before us, the trial court and both parties 
treated the matter a level two encounter. Such a stop requires 
that 'the officer have a reasonable suspicion, based on 
objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity.' State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)...'Absent 
reasonable suspicion, evidence derived from the stop is fruit of 
the poisonous tree and must be excluded.' State v. Baird, 763 P2d 
1214, 1216 (Utah 1988). 
There is no bright line test for what is, or in not, 
reasonable suspicion. Id. Whether the officer had reasonable 
suspicion depends on the 'totality of the circumstances.' Id. 
The 'totality of the circumstances' analysis must be based upon 
all the circumstances and must 'raise a suspicion that the 
particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.' 
U.S. v. Cortezf 449 U.S. 404 (1981). Put differently, the 
officers must have a 'particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting criminal activity by the particular person detained.' 
State v. Seryr 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Thus in Brown v. Texas, 443, U.S. 47 (1979), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the mere presence of a person in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users does not give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that such person is involved in criminal 
conduct. In Carpena, the Utah Supreme Court held that a slowly 
moving vehicle, with out-of-state plates, in a neighborhood in 
which a number of burglaries had occurred, without more, is 
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion to justify detention 
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of the occupants thereof. In State v. Truiillo, 7 39 P. 2d 85 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), a stop based on the lateness of the hour 
and the high-crime factor in the area was found to be 
unconstitutional because the officer lacked a reasonable 
suspicion as to Trujillo, the individual stopped. and, in 
Sierra, we held that no reasonable suspicion existed when such 
was solely based on out-of-state plates, the occupant/s 
suspicious appearance and his reaction upon observing a police 
officer. State v. Steward, 153 Utah Ado. Rep. 24, 25-26 1991). 
In the instant case we have what would appear to be a level 
2 stop, but there is not sufficient independent corroborating 
evidence to justify a level 3 detention. Therefore, since the 
officers did not have justification for a level 3 stop as 
outlined in Johnson and Steward, the arrest was illegal and the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 
C. Defendant's pre-arrest statements 
were illegally obtained. 
The defendant contends that the pre-arrest inculpatory 
statements made by him were illegally obtained. At the time the 
statements were made, the defendant was outside of his vehicle 
and the statements were made in response to Officer Wasden direct 
questioning. The defendant was not free to leave and had 
submitted to the custody of the officer. 
Section 77-7-1 of the Utah Code, as amended, provides in 
pertinent part that lfAn arrest is an actual restraint of the 
person arrested or submission to custody« (Emphasis added.) 
Defendant contends that his statements were made while his 
freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with 
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formal arrest. Salt: Lake City v. Womack, 747 P. 2d 1039 (Utah 
1987), Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), and 
State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1987). While the defendant 
was not under formal arrest, he had submitted to the officer's 
custody and was not free to leave the scene. 
The case at bar presents a clear demarcation line to apply 
the ruling in Garner as to when a Miranda warning is required. 
At the time defendant's pre-arrest inculpatory statements were 
made, defendant was outside of his vehicle and was not free to 
leave the scene. Furthermore, the defendant had acceded to the 
officer's request to exit his vehicle and subject himself to the 
officer's instructions and custody. The setting had therefore 
become custodial rather than investigatory, since the focus of 
attention was directed to the defendant. 
D. Fifth Amendment Violation 
Officer Wasden's method of obtaining the evidence upon which 
to base probable cause for the arrest was a flagrant violation of 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The Fifth 
Amendment states: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution similarly states: 
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"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself. . . . " 
In this case the defendant was compelled by the duress 
applied by the officer when he was compelled to perform field 
sobriety tests, to give evidence against himself. The defendant 
further contends that he had been deprived of his liberty and was 
not free to leave the scene—a violation of the fundamental 
purpose of this constitutional provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Officer Wasden did not have reasonable suspicion to stop 
Harold's vehicle. The only reason officer Wasden stopped the 
vehicle was for an alleged wide turn made by Harold. If officer 
Wasden stopped every car in the Salt Lake Valley which made a 
wide turn, officer Wasden would have no other duty than writing 
traffic tickets. Clearly, Officer Wasden stopped Harold as a 
pretext for further investigation into a more serious crime. 
Additionally, since Officer Wasden had no reasonable suspicion to 
stop Harold's vehicle, and since the alleged indicia of 
intoxication and the field coordination procedures should have 
been suppressed, the argument holds that Officer Wasden also did 
not have probable cause to arrest Harold for the alleged DUI. 
Therefore, the Court should dismiss the charges against Harold as 
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a matter of law. —~7 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ -~dav of-a*rne, 1991 
L. -Song- / 
o^y 
Lawyer for Defendant 
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APPENDIX 7. 
25 
' SALT LAK 
vs. 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
E CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 9120109037TC J 
) PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 1 
HAROLD BECKSTEAD, ) 
1991 
Defendant. ) | 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of August, 
, commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable n.D. JONES 
sitting 
this 
For 
For 
as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of 
cause, and that the following proceedings were had. 
the 
the 
-oOo-
A P P E A_ R A N C E S 
City: MS. JANICE FROST 
City Prosecutor's Office 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Defendant: MR. LARRY LONG 
Attorney at Law 
39 East Exchanqe Place, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
m?i 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
[Prior proceedings recorded but not requested to ! 
be transcribed.] 
THE COURT: Mr. Long? | 
i 
MR. LONG: I'n not sure what your Honor's desires J 
i 
i 
are about lunch, do you want ne to continue or— 
THE COURT: Yes, we'll go ahead. 
MR. LONG: All right. j 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LONG: 
Q Officer Wasden--it's Lieutenant Wasden, I should say. 
A That's okay, 
Q Let ne just hand you, so we can kind of get a 
picture of this, Defendant's Exhibits D-l, D-2, D-3, and see 
if those accurately represent the traffic lane, the outside 
traffic lane facing southward from say Third South intersections 
A Yes, if you were--if you were back further. I 
assume what I'm looking at from here is you're just south of 
the 300 South curb line, just south of the bus stop. It 
doesn't show the bus stop in that first one. The same in this 
one, so you1re further south, almost to the corner of 400 
South. 
And then this looks like there at the Exchange, where 
the curb comes back out at Exchange. So, what this shows is J 
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more--
Q You're referring to D-l? 
A D-l, yes, uh huh (affirmative). It's not as far 
back as the bus stop, I — as I look at that, I don't—you knov;, 
and I assume the bus stop is back behind there, further north 
from there. There's a bus stop and~-
Q Well, does it accurately represent the view that vou 
would get, say, from the bus stop on southward? 
A That's what I recognize it at, yes. 
Q All right. 
MR. LONG: I would tender this as an exhibit just for 
demonstrative purposes to shov; what the--the scene was like as 
Officer Wasden saw it. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MS. FROST: I don't have any objection. 
THE COURT: May be received. 
MR. LONG: May I publish this photograph? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Long) And Exhibit D-2, does it also 
accurately represent the — 
A It appears to be just a little further south, 
standing looking south on State Street. You're coming— 
getting a little closer to Exchange Street with 400 South. 
It's a little difficult to follow the curb line because of the 
parked vehicles, but--
3 
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Q Uh huh (affirmative). And also Defendant's Exhibit 
3? 
A In that third exhibit, clear—you know, it shows 
there at Exchange hov; the curb comes back out, and that looks 
to me, appears to me to be Exchange and State Street south-
bound. 
Q All right. 
A And shows how the curb line juts out. 
MR. LONG: I would tender Defendant's Exhibit 2 and 
3 for demonstrative purposes, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Ms. Frost? 
MS. FROST: No objection. 
THE COURT: May be received. 
MR. LONG: May I publish them? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
Q (By Mr. Long) And let me hand you what's now been 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit 4 and ask you if that accurately 
represents a view of, as you were turning to go westbound 
on Fourth South from Third—from State Street, would that 
accurately represent the view you'd have? 
A Based on the buildings I'm seeing in this picture 
on the south side, if that is in fact it, it would represent 
Fourth South and State from the northwest corner. I believe 
that would be the drive-through and so that helps me recognize 
that photo, so I—it looks to me like west—that northwest 
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corner of Fourth South looking to the southwest. 
MR. LONG: I v/ould tender Defendant's Exhibit 4 as 
demonstrative evidence. 
THE COURT: Ms. Frost? 
MS. FROST: No objection. 
THE COURT: May be received. 
MR. LONG: May I publish that? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
Q (By Mr. Long) And let me hand you what's been 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit 5 and ask you if that would 
accurately reflect a view facing east, approximately where 
Mr. Beckstead pulled his car over? 
A I would—I'd need to be able to see Cactus Street 
to put it in perspective. It does appear to be looking east 
on Fourth South, maybe, you know, in my estimation, mid-
block between Cactus, about a quarter block west of State 
Street, and I believe a little further west than this picture 
shows. 
Q I see. But it does accurately reflect what's a 
little east of where he pulled over? 
A Fourth South and State? 
Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
A It accurately would depict a view of about, oh, 
No.—No. 25 o r — n o , No. 75, about No. 75 East on 400 South. 
Q All right. 
_ 5 
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MR. 
5, your Honor 
THE 
MS. 
LONG: I would tender Defendant's Exhibit No. ! 
, as demonstrative. 
COURT: 
FROST: 
think it!s relevant. 
M.s. Frost? 
Your Honor, 
The officer 
he did whatever he did. 
THE COURT: I \zould sus 
basis the officer said it's east 
MR. 
looks like — 
THE 
MR. 
stopped. 
THE 
exhibit? 
MR. 
20-some feet \ 
LONG: 
COURT: 
LONG : 
COURT: 
LONG: 
i 
i 
i 
j 
City objects. I don't | 
1s testified it's not where j 
i 
tain the objection on the i 
of where the stop occurred. j 
But it's just showing what the street j 
Well--
--that he first drove down before he 
Well, v/hat 
Well, to sho 
/ide, and that there 
for parked cars, or 
THE 
purpose only. 
MR, 
THE 
MR. 
this? 
THE 
COURT: 
LONG: 
COURT: 
LONG: 
COURT: 
is the purpose of the 
w that this lane here is 
are no—no markings here 
a parking lane. 
Well, it wi 
All right. 
But not as 
That's fine, 
Yes, sir. 
6 
11 be admitted for that 
the location of the stop. 
your Honor. May I publish 
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ma 
re 
Q 
rked 
(By Mr. Long) And let me hand you what has been 
as Defendant1 
presents a view of 
field sobriety tests 
th 
A 
ere ' s 
Cactus 
It coul 
[ area. 
pu. 
If 
it 
Q 
rpose 
A 
Q 
A 
it's 
1
 s di 
Boy , I'll 
nothing that 
Street 
d have 
The 
and I 
been a 
sidewa 
s Exhibit 6 and ask you if that 
the sidewalk approximately whe 
were conducted? 
have a real hard time with that 
clearly indicates. We were ju 
can't nut this photo into any p 
number of locations along the 
Ik would be similar to what's, s 
Well, maybe I could introduce it just for 
that thatfs 
This is th 
Right. Th 
what the sidewalk--
e type of sidewalk area that we 
at's — 
accurately ! 
re the 
, because 
st east of 
erspective. 
downtown 
hown here. 
the 
we re on. 
I don't know that that's of the exact location. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MS. 
— 
THE 
MS. 
LONG: 
COURT: 
LONG : 
FROST: 
COURT: 
FROST: 
I would tender-
Ms. Frost? 
--Defendant's Exhibit 6* 
Well, your Honor, I still wou 
Let me see it. 
Id object. 
—can't be isolated to the area, then 
fficult to prove that it's relevant. 
MR. 
THE 
LONG: 
COURT: 
The sidewalk along that whole 
Well, I appreciate the point, 
2 
block i s — 
Counsel, 
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but I th 
Q 
business 
ink the objection would be sustained on this one. 
Thank you, 
(By 
sir. 
Mr. Long) Do you happen to remember what 
was in front ot where the field coordination 
procedures were conducted? 
Exh 
Str< 
side 
the 
the 
9 / ] 
mar 
are 
pho 
A 
Q 
ibit 1 
I don't. 
Let 
Vo. 9t 
2et there, 
2 walk 
A 
area 
stop 
Q 
/our 
Q 
p 
Yes. 
me hand you what's been narked as Defendant's 
and you can see the intersection with Cactus 
and per 
That1 
haps that accurately reflects the 
s — that's Cactus Street and that — that fs 
there in, right in through there, v/here we did have 
• 
Thank you. 
MR. 
Honor, 
MS. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
(By 
LONG: 
FROST: 
COURT: 
LONG: 
COURT: 
I would tender Defendant's Exhibit No. 
No objection. 
May be received* 
May I publish it? 
Yes, sir. 
Mr. Long) And let me hand you what's been 
ked as Defendant's 
also 
A 
togra 
what 
; Exhibits 7 and 8, and ask you if those 
!s in that general area? 
Once again, 
phs , < 
I—I can't tell an area from the 
and so there are — the bricks are innerlaid into 
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the sidewalk at places and there are the decorative ornamental 
iron things there, between the actual walking, sidewalk area 
and the curb and similar to what these pictures depict; but 
I donft know that it's the same area. 
Q All right. 
A I can't identify it from the pictures. I cannot. 
MR. LONG: I would tender these exhibits, your 
Honor, merely as illustrative of the type of--of brickwork 
and they have planter boxes and trees going out of them, with 
concrete around that and the brickwork that's kind of inter-
laced in between them. 
MS. FROST: City objects, your Honor. The officer 
can't put this in the area that he was in, and Exhibit No. 9, 
previously admitted, shows that information--
THE COURT: Let's see the other exhibit. 
MS. FROST: —and has been identified as the area. 
THE COURT: The one that was admitted. 
MR. LONG: I think maybe one of the other ones might 
show the planters better. 
THE COURT: I would—I would sustain the objection 
to these because there's—the officer can't identify them. 
MR. LONG: Maybe this makes it more easy to see. 
THE COURT: Well, that has been already admitted. 
It shows, however, the southwest corner of Fourth South, 
doesn't it? 
o 
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MR. LONG: You're right. 
THE COURT: That shows the southwest corner, 
MR. LONG: Oh, that's right, that's the turn. That's 
the other side of the street. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that's the other side of the 
street. 
I--I would sustain the objection because the 
foundation, the officer's identification doesn't provide 
foundation for it. He says he doesn't know. 
MR. LONG: I think one of those has been published. 
THE COURT: No, I crave you the one that — 
MR. LONG: Those two are—you're going to keep out 
and this o n e — 
THE COURT: This one has already been. I'll sustain 
the objection on this one. 
MR. LONG: Well, that one was introduced, I think. 
THE COURT: No, this was not. This is one I 
sustained the objection on, because again--
MR. LONG: Oh, all right. 
THE COURT: — t h e officer couldn't--
MR. LONG: You're right. You're right. 
THE COURT: —couldn't lay the foundation. 
Q (By Mr. Long) Now, as you were following, when you 
first noticed Mr. Beckstead's vehicle, v/here were you? Were 
you approximately in the position of the Defendant's Exhibit 
10 
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No. 1, wh 
A 
Q 
A 
1 Q 
A 
close to 
Q 
section a 
A 
Q 
he? 
A 
Q 
ich I've showed you? 
No. I would have been north of there. 
How far north would you have been? 
North of 300 South. j 
And where was Mr. Beckstead's vehicle? j 
My recollection is that he was in--approaching or 
the intersection of 390 South. 
I see. So, he went completely through the inter-
md you watched him? 
I watched him go through the 300 South intersection. 
I see. And he didn't violate any traffic laws, did 
No, sir. 
And you never testified, when you testified before 
under oath, you didn't testify that he was going very slowly, 
did you? 
A 
hearing? 
Q 
A 
Q 
I don't recall. Under—at the Driver's License 
Right. 
I donft recall if the question was asked. 
But anyway, he didn't do any kind of a traffic 
violation that would warrant pulling him over; is that right? 
A A red light type of thing or anything like that, are 
you asking? 
Q Right. 
11 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR /^gSSESfej, 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 fiflK7T^\Si 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 /* / ffi£4\ \o\ 
A No, sir, 
0 So, v/hen you saw hin kind of moving down the street, 
I think you said three to four feet, within his own lane; it's j 
a rather a wide lane there, is it not? j 
A Yes, sir. The outside lane is quite wide, especially! 
i 
where the—the parking lane and bus stop areas exist. j 
Q And that would be Defendant's Exhibit 1, there? 
A Well, if — if you look into 1, 2 and 3, all three, j 
do you have all three of those there? 
Q I do. 
A If you look at all three of them, you can see the 
curb line further north of here juts out substantially like it I 
juts back in on—as you can see here, you can see it quite 
clearly in that exhibit. And so it was north of there that I 
observed him coming through 300 South and then began to follov; 
the curb line, weaving within that lane and just stay over into 
that parking and bus stop area and then move back over, down 
in this area. 
Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
A There weren't the cars parked there that are shown 
in that photograph, so... 
Q So, there were no cars parked there at 11:30 at 
night? 
A I don't — I don't recall any cars being parked in 
that lane at all, in that parking and bus stop area. 
U 
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Q So, in other \.Tords, if you--if there's nobodv 
parked there, it is really a wide lane; ricrht? 
A Really a wide lane, yes, sir. 
Q Double lane. So, none of the three to four foot 
weaving of Mr. Beckstead didn't endanger any of the vehicles? 
A No, sir. It did not. 
Q I see. Nov;, I think it was your testimony before 
when you said you wouldn't issue a traffic violation for it, 
and that was the weaving? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q But you pulled hin over anyway? 
A Yes, sir. 
0 And wasn't it because you—you had a hunch? "I 
suspected that he may have been drinking based on the driving 
pattern I'd seen"? 
A Yes, sir. That's correct. 
Q I see. So, at that particular time, you suspected 
that he'd been drinking and that was really the reason you 
pulled him over? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Now, he pulled over immediately, did he not? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And when he did, you had an unmarked police car, 
so what kind of lights did you turn on? 
A What I had was the red-and-blue flashing grill 
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1 lights, and a hand-pointed spotlight that's mounted and 
2 flash—it puts a red light up into the back of his vehicle. 
3 Q I see. And there was no hesitation on his part? 
4 A Nothing that I thought was exceptional. I mean, 
5 he—he recognized that I was a police officer, that the red 
6 light was there from the time he was making his right turn 
7 and pulled over before he got to Cactus Street, v/hich is three-
8 300 feet, maybe. 
9 Q All right. 
10 MR. LONG: I believe at this point, your Honor, I 
11 would reinstate my motion to dismiss this case on the grounds 
12 of pretext stop. I think the officer's testimony just now 
13 was the only reason that he pulled him over was he suspected 
14 a drinking driver. 
15 THE COURT: Ms. Frost, do you wish t o — 
16 MS. FROST: Your Honor, I think that he had probable 
17 cause based on the driving pattern to pull him over for a 
18 suspected DUI. That's all the law requires, it doesn't 
19 require that he violate some other traffic lav/. 
20 THE COURT: The conditions existing in the way he 
21 drove down the street, I think provided probable cause. The 
22 officer's training and background indicated there might be a 
23 problem with alcohol. I think it's soundly based on experience 
24 and view, and your motion is denied, sir. 
25 MR. LONG: I do have some cases on that I'd be happy 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
to provide to the Court at lunch. 
THE COURT: I—I'n aware of the cases. But in this 
specific instance, it was a very wide lane, which was—turns, 
corp.es and has several indentations. Mow, I do not believe 
normal driving patterns would include following that curb 
line through a bus stop and other parking areas. it seems to 
me that the normal, prudent way of driving that street was to 
stay on the left-hand side where the lane is and drive straightj 
down. I think that turning in and out and the officer's 
experience of 10 years is sufficient to--for probable cause. 
MR. LONG: All right. 
Q (By Mr. Long) Now, I think your testimony v/as that 
he—that he was in a truck so you couldn't really see who was 
in that—the truck, when you were following it? 
A Yes. I could—I could not see easily from the rear 
portion of the truck up to the front. 
Q And so I think it was your testimony that you 
couldn't tell— 
MS. FROST: Your Plonor, I'm going to object to the 
form of the question. This is not his testimony on this 
occasion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Long) So, in other words, you couldn't tell 
whether Mr. Beckstead v/as looking at the sidewalk for someone? 
A No, sir. 
15 
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Q I see. And if they —if that was the case, then it 
would be a reasonable explanation for his weavinq, would it 
not? 
A If that explanation had been proffered, sure. 
Q I see. But you never asked him a question like 
that, did you? 
A I explained to him why he v/as being stopped, I 
explained what I observed and I explained my concerns with 
the alcohol, and at no time did he tell me he was looking for 
someone or that, you know, that v/as the case. 
Q And so when you first walked up to the window, 
didn't you ask Mr. Beckstead, do you know why I pulled you 
over? 
A I don't recall asking that question of Mr. Beckstead, 
Q You don't remember him saying, "No, I have no idea"? 
A No, sir. 
0 And you don't remeruLer telling him it was because 
he made a wide turn at the intersection of Fourth South and 
State? 
A No. In fact, he didn't make a wide turn. 
Q And drawing your attention to Defendant's Exhibit 
D-5, shows that the—the lane there is enormous, doesn't it? 
A Again, I didn't feel he made a wide turn, so I 
never discussed a wide turn with him. 
Q All right. 
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